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Abstract 
Based on an ongoing attempt o integrate Natural Language instructions with human figure 
animation, we demonstrate that agents’ understanding and use of instructions can complement 
what they can derive from the environment in which they act. We focus on two attitudes that 
contribute to agents’ behavior--their intentions and their expectations-and shown how Natural 
Language instructions contribute to such attitudes in ways that complement the environment. We 
also show that instructions can require more than one context of interpretation and thus that agents’ 
understanding of instructions can evolve as their activity progresses. A significant consequence 
is that Natural Language understanding in the context of behavior cannot simply be treated as 
“front end” processing, but rather must be integrated more deeply into the processes that guide 
an agent’s behavior and respond to its perceptions. 
1. Introduction 
This is a short position paper on what we have learned about language, behavior 
and the environment from an ongoing attempt to use Natural Language instructions to 
guide the task-related behavior of animated human figures. While the project, AnimNL 
(for “Animation and Natural Language”), is not yet ready to deliver a prototype, we 
believe that what we have so far learned from this attempt to produce a complete vertical 
integration from language to animated behavior will be of interest and benefit to others 
as well. 
AnimNL builds upon the Jackm animation system developed at the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Computer Graphics Research Laboratory. In Jack, animation follows 
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Fig. I. SodaJack placing a glass on the counter. 
from model-based simulation of virtual agents acting in an environment. The agents 
of primary interest are Jack’s biomechanically reasonable and anthropometrically-scaled 
human models (see Fig. 1). The models have 138 joints, including an accurate torso, 
and a growing repertoire of naturalistic behaviors such as walking, stepping, looking, 
reaching, turning, grasping, strength-based lifting, and both obstacle and self-collision 
avoidance [ 51. Each of these behaviors is environmentally reactive. That is, incremental 
computation is able to adjust an agent’s performance to the situation, as the situation 
progresses, without further involvement of the higher-level processes [lo] unless an 
exceptional failure condition is signaled. Different limits can be placed on an agent’s 
vision, strength and comfort threshold, for more realistic environmental response, and 
different environments can easily be constructed, so as to vary the situations in which 
the figures are acting. ’ 
With these features, we believe that Jack can provide a fairly realistic target for linking 
Natural Language with behavior. This is because Jack agents “naturally” face limits on 
their ability to understand Natural Language utterances, much as people do: their ability 
to understand language relies on their knowledge, their knowledge is mediated by what 
they can perceive, and their perception is limited. Moreover, since Jack agents can, 
like people, effect changes on their world, their understanding of language can evolve 
through intentional activity in the world (cf. Section 2). 
From our work with Jack, what we have been led to believe about language, behavior 
and the environment is that: 
’ In discussing agents, we will use the pronoun “he” , since we will be using a male figure in our illustrated 
example-i.e., a figure with male body proportions. The Jack animation system provides anthropometrically- 
sizable female figures as well. 
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l Just as an agent may be motivated by its environment to consider adopting particular 
goals as intentions that will guide its subsequent behavior, so an agent may also 
be motivated by Natural Language instructions. Moreover, goals recognized as 
being situationally relevant either through perceiving the environment or processing 
instructions, can clarify the meaning of other instructions. (Huffman and Laird 
[ 321 see a similar complementarity of roles between language and the environment 
in an agent’s acquisition of procedural knowledge.) 
l Just as an agent uses its perception of the current environment to augment its 
knowledge and guide its current behavior, so too can an agent use expectations 
derived from instructions about how a situation will evolve, to augment its beliefs 
and guide its current and future behavior. 
Intentions and expectations can complement one another. Intentions can embody an 
agent’s expectations that the agent can act in ways to satisfy those intentions, while 
expectations can lead an agent to form intentions to check that those expectations are 
satisfied and to take corrective actions if not. 
Three caveats are necessary here: one involving the quality of everyday instructions, a 
second involving the sources of an agent’s intentions, and a third involving the existence 
of a distinct “instructor”. 
First, the task of formulating instructions is clearly not without problems for human 
language users, as the prevalence of incomprehensible and/or useless instructions shows. 
Two of our own favorites are: 
l “Replace items on vehicle with items contained in this kit.” (ANCO Replacement 
Windshield-Washer Pump, Stock No. 61-14); 
l “To access the next highest programmed station setting, or to switch to a lower pro- 
grammed station, the SCAN buttons must be repeatedly pressed.” (VCR, Mitsubishi 
Electronics). 
There are many possible things to blame for the prevalence of poor instructions, including 
( 1) the prevalence of poor writing, in general; (2) a writer’s inability to be too specific, 
because they lack detailed knowledge of the exact situation in which the task will 
be carried out; and (3) the difficulty people have in converting narrative accounts of 
past behavior or experience into effective instructions for future behavior. (Recall, for 
example, the joke about the bus rider who asks a fellow passenger where he should get 
off for City Hall. The latter replies, “Just get off one stop before I do”.) 
While significant work is being done to improve the quality of instructions [ 3,17,25, 
45,461, in the end, one may have to accept that no fixed instruction set can serve all 
agents in all situations. 
Secondly, real agents will always have additional intentions that come from sources 
other than instructions: intentions arise from personal goals and desires, as well as from 
the policies (social, governmental, etc.) an agent agrees to adhere to. However, we have 
simplified the situation to one of semi-autonomous agents who have no other intentions 
than those that follow from their given instructions. This does not mean, however, that 
nothing else influences their behavior. Since Jack agents are environmentally reactive, 
features in the changing environment affect their behavior as well. For example, an 
agent instructed to go to the door may also have to take action to avoid obstacles 
it finds blocking its way. In future work, we plan to address instructions that convey 
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general policy, and to allow it to affect agent behavior as well. For animated agent 
behavior that follows from particular personality traits, the reader is referred to work by 
Bates et al. [9,37] and by Morawetz [ 141. 
Thirdly, in real life there is often no distinct instructor around. In the case of multi- 
person tasks, this means the conduct of a task is often a product of negotiation by the 
participants, each with their own knowledge and beliefs [29,47]. The intentions and 
expectations of any one of them then may then reflect what has been negotiated by 
the group. We argue though that the situation with a distinct instructor can show more 
simply that instructions can allow an agent to form beliefs about the world that it can 
act on with relative confidence. 
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we discuss plans and in- 
structions in general, as well as some related work. We also give a brief overview 
of AnimNL, in support of the points we will be making about instructions, intentions 
and expectations. Intentions are then discussed in Section 3, and Expectations in Sec- 
tion 4. 
2. Background 
2.1. Plans and instructions 
Early views of Natural Language instructions corresponded to the early views of 
plans: instructions were treated as specifying nodes of a plan that, when completely 
expanded into primitive action specifications, would control agent behavior. This view, 
for example, underlies SHRDLU’s successful response to instructions such as “Pick up 
the green pyramid and put it in the box” [ 541. 
That plans should not be viewed as control structures has already been well argued by 
Agre and Chapman [ 11, Pollack [ 421, Suchman [ 481, and others in the field. Agre and 
Chapman show that when people form plans in response to instructions, they appear to 
use those plans as resources. The actual task situation may then lead them to interpolate 
additional actions not mentioned in the instructions, to replace actions specified in the 
instructions with other ones that seem better suited to the situation, and to ground 
referring terms as a consequence of their actions rather than as a precondition for them. 
Other researchers, working in what has come to be called a BDZ framework (“beliefs, 
desires and intentions”) now view planning in terms of agents adopting (and dropping) 
intentions to act [ 13,16,29,43]. 
A plan’s relationship with a set of instructions is also not rigid. It depends, inter ah, 
on various features of the instructions, including: 
l whether the instructions convey doctrine (general policy regarding behavior in some 
range of situations) or procedure (actions to be taken now or at some specified 
time in the future) ; 
l in the case of procedural instructions, whether they are given before, during, or 
after action; 
l whether the instructions are meant as advice, suggestion, order, request, warning, 
or tutorial. 
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These features are apparent in recent work involving instructed agents. For example, 
in Chapman’s work [ 151, instructions are given as advice to agents already engaged 
in an activity. They are treated as additional evidence for an action alternative already 
identified by the agent as being relevant to the current situation. That alternative may 
not, however, be taken immediately (or ever) if other alternatives have more evidence in 
their favor. Chapman derives this view from observing how arcade game players follow 
instructions given to them by kibbitzers watching them play. (Chapman also notes that 
negative instructions can be similarly understood as evidence against actions.) 
Vere and Bickmore treat most instructions to their “basic agent”, Homer, as orders 
to carry out specific tasks [50]. However, they have also enabled Homer to interpret 
negative instructions as policy that can override orders that conflict with it. They give 
an example in which Homer (a small submarine) is told not to leave its island, and it 
subsequently refuses to comply with an instruction to take a picture of the Codfish (a 
ship) because to do so would require leaving the island. 
Work by Alterman and his students [ 21 shows how instructions given after an incorrect 
action has been performed are treated as assistance, helping agents to accommodate their 
existing routines to the device currently at hand. In this approach, routines evolved over 
many different instances of engagement help focus an agent on the details of the situation 
that require attention and on the decisions that must be made. Instructions may interrupt 
activity to call attention to other relevant details or decisions, or to correct decisions 
already made. Neither plans nor instructions function as control structures that determine 
the agent’s behavior. 
Our own work has focussed on procedural instructions given to agents before un- 
dertaking a task. Such instructions can be found in user’s manuals, owner’s manuals, 
maintenance manuals, and “how to” books-for example, 
l Depress door release button to open door and expose paper bag. (Royal CAN 
VACTM Owner’s Manual, p. 5.) 
l Remove safety wire from access unit adjusting bolt and adjusting link and loosen 
bolt. (Air Force Manual T.O.IF-16C-2-94JG-50-2, Ammunition Drum, Removal 
and Installation.) 
l If candle wax falls on a piece of furniture, wait until it solidifies, then pick it off 
with your fingernail or a plastic spatula. (McGowan and DuBern, Home Repair. 
London: Dorling Kindersley Ltd. 1991, p. 22.) 
One application that could benefit from the ability to understand and animate agent 
behavior that would follow from such instructions is tusk analysis in connection with 
Computer-Aided Design. By enabling virtual human agents to carry out maintenance 
and repair tasks in the CAD environment itself, a designer could determine before the 
artifacts were built whether people would be able to carry out those tasks in anticipated 
environments. 
There are at least three ways to make different virtual agents interact with objects 
in different virtual environments. One way is through direct manipulation, which would 
require a designer to directly control a range of different agents in a range of different 
environments, in order to observe and evaluate their behavior. A second way is through 
direct motion sensing (e.g. “Virtual Reality” kinesthetic input [4] ). The third way 
is through Natural Language level instructions. This could be the most economical, 
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since it would allow the designer to simply “rerun” the same instructions with different 
agent-environment pairs, in order to accomplish the same ends. 
Other potential application areas for using instructions to direct the behavior of ani- 
mated agents include group training activities and multi-agent simulations. Thus we feel 
that enabling virtual human agents to understand instructions is of practical as well as 
theoretical interest. 
2.2. Overview of the AnimNL architecture 
We begin with a brief overview of the AnimNL architecture, since it captures our 
beliefs that language understanding is a process that evolves, in part, through principled 
interaction with the world. Roughly speaking, AnimNL consists of three interacting 
modules: 
l A module consisting of processes that work towards understanding an instruction 
step in terms of an initial structure of intentions, which we call a plan graph. These 
processes include parsing, interpretation and plan inference [ 18-211. 
l A module consisting of a high-level incremental planner and two specialized pro- 
cesses able to adapt highly-parameterized plans for search and for object manipu- 
lation to the exact situation at hand [ 26-28,35,41 I. 
l A simulator that coordinates motion directives and perceptual requests from the 
planning components with ones corresponding to environmental responses, and 
schedules their performance. An agenda allows multiple behaviors to be carried out 
in parallel, and other behaviors to be initiated and terminated asynchronously with 
respect to each other [ 101. 
The result is that an agent’s behavior at any time reflects both its low-level responses 
to the current environment and the current state of its high-level intentions. A more 
detailed description of the AnimNL architecture can be found in [ 531. 
3. Intentions from instructions 
Intentions have been identified as a factor in rational behavior by various researchers 
(e.g., [ 12,13,15,42] ), who see them as playing at least two roles: ( 1) they can 
constrain the courses of action an agent need consider to those consistent with what the 
agent already plans to do; and (2) they can be used to determine when an action can 
be said to be relevant, to have succeeded or to have failed. 
We have found that goals specified in instructions-which, in the case of positive 
instructions, are goals that agents are being ordered or advised or requested to adopt 
as their intentions-can also affect ( 1) how an agent interprets action descriptions 
in those instructions and (2) how the agent behaves in carrying out actions. In the 
first case, instructions perform a role that Chapman’s Ph.D. thesis [ 151 shows can 
also be performed by the environment. In Chapman’s work, apparently underspecified 
instructions are interpreted simply as evidence for a response to the current environment 
that has already been deemed relevant on the basis of perception. Therefore, if a knife 
can be used either to kill a monster or to jimmy a door, and if a monster is threatening 
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the agent and no door needs to be jimmied (e.g., to enable the agent to escape), an 
instruction such as “use the knife” will be understood only as advice to kill the monster. 
In Section 3.1, we show how goals specified in Natural Language instructions can 
function in a similar way, and in Section 3.2, we comment on how intentions derived 
from instructions can affect low-level behavioral features. We conclude in Section 3.3 
with a brief discussion on how the action representation used in AnimNL allows its 
high-level planner to use intentions effectively. 
3.1. Behavioral import of purpose clauses 
Comments are often made about the e&iency of Natural Language-how much 
of an utterance’s meaning can be left unspecified, to be filled in by listeners able 
to draw on an appropriate context. In this light, we have come to understand that 
purpose clauses-infinitival clauses that convey the goal of an action-provide a helpful 
source of information for understanding underspecified action descriptions which convey 
information implicitly through context. While this information could of course be made 
explicit, people seem not to expect this: speakers commonly leave it for hearers to figure 
out for themselves. 2 
Consider the following example (from [ 181) : 
Place a plank between two ladders to make a simple scaffold. 
The action description in the main clause is “place a plank between two ladders”. The 
goal conveyed in the purpose clause is “make a simple scaffold”. Now, by itself, the main 
clause conveys no explicit constraints on the orientation of what have to be two step- 
ladders and only one constraint on the placement of the plank-that it be somewhere in 
the three-dimensional space “between” wherever the step-ladders are. However there are 
significant implicit constraints that follow from the purpose of making a simple scaffold: 
the ladders should be aligned with their treads facing outwards in opposite directions, 
at a distance spannable by the plank, which should be placed horizontally on treads of 
the two ladders that are the same height off the ground. (How high off the ground will 
depend on the purpose of the scaffold: it is not determinable from the given instruction 
alone.) An (incremental) plan can then be formulated to comply with both the explicit 
and implicit constraints on the procedure and its intended result. 
Our second example is intended to show that an agent can use a goal expression and 
perceptual tests on when that goal is achieved to determine the referent of a noun phrase 
and hence what action he or she is meant to carry out. The instruction to be considered 
is: 
Vacuum the rug or carpet against the direction of the pile to leave it raised. 
’ There are, of course, other linguistic means of conveying purpose-free adjuncts [ 521, means clauses 
I 7.8 1, and even simple conjunction [ 241. Moreover, clauses that convey purpose do serve other functions as 
well, such as making an action description easier to understand [22,23] or justifying why an action should 
be done [ 81. Our point here is simply that any linguistic specification of goals (purpose clauses being a clear 
example) can serve, like the environment, as the context in which an underspecified action description can be 
elaborated and thereby correctly understood. 
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To follow this instruction, an agent must know the direction referred to as “against the 
direction of the pile”. If the agent does not know the referent of this phrase before 
starting, the purpose clause (“to leave it raised”) can be used to guide his or her search 
for it. That is, the agent can plan to vacuum a bit in various directions and observe 
which direction of sweep leaves the pile raised. At this point, the agent can begin to 
elaborate a plan for vacuuming the entire rug or carpet in that direction and thereby 
finish the job. 
A further example is related to a matter we return to in Section 4, and concerns 
the termination conditions associated with perceptual tests. (The instructions are for 
removing wine stains from a rug or carpet.) 
Blot with clean tissues to remove any liquid still standing. Sprinkle liberally with 
salt to extract liquid that has soaked into the fabric. Vacuum up the salt. 
In the first sentence, blotting with clean tissues specifies a type of activity but not the 
extent to which it should be pursued. (In the terminology of Moens and Steedman [40], 
it is simply a process like “running”, not a culminated process like “running a mile”: 
it has no intrinsic endpoint.) How long an agent should blot the stained area comes 
from the purpose clause “to remove any liquid still standing”: the agent should plan to 
interleave blotting with perception, until no standing liquid is left visible. 
The purpose clause in the second sentence conveys in a somewhat different way the 
condition under which the agent can start the final step, vacuuming up the salt. It is 
not the termination point of the sprinkling (which is terminated when the agent decides 
there is now a “liberal” amount of salt on the stain [ 34]>, but that of the subsequent 
waiting. How long the agent should wait comes from the purpose clause “to extract 
liquid that has soaked into the fabric”. The agent must plan to interleave waiting with 
perception, continuing until he perceives that the salt is damp (i.e., a change in visual 
texture). At this point, the salt has extracted as much liquid as it can, and the agent can 
commence vacuuming. 
This example illustrates the complementary relation between intention and expectation: 
the intention to remove the standing liquid leads to an expectation that blotting it will 
eventually accomplish this removal, which in turn leads to an intention to observe the 
situation, monitoring for the expected point at which no liquid will be left standing. 
To say the above is not to say that an agent’s only intentions are those derived 
from instructions, but rather that goals specified in instructions, which the agent may 
adopt as intentions, can provide a context for fully understanding underspecified action 
description in instructions. 
Di Eugenio has designed and implemented the machinery to be used in AnimNL 
for computing many of the inferences that follow from understanding that the action 
cy described in the main clause of an utterance is being done for the purpose r de- 
scribed in a purpose clause. This relationship between (Y and 7 can be characterized 
more specifically as either generation or enablement. In generation, executing LY under 
appropriate circumstances is all that is required to achieve r. In enablement, cr brings 
about circumstances in which r can be generated by subsequent actions. 
Di Eugenio’s approach makes use of both linguistic knowledge and planning knowl- 
edge. A knowledge base of plan schemata (or recipes) complements a taxonomic 
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structure of action descriptions. The latter is represented in Classic [ 111 and exploits 
clussi$cation to allow an inference algorithm to find related action descriptions. These 
descriptions index into the knowledge base of recipes which includes information about 
generation, enablement and sub-structure r lationships between actions. The inference 
algorithms on these linked structures are described in detail in [ 18,191. 
An instruction may convey to the agent that a generation or enablement relationship 
holds between two actions, without the agent being able to determine which one, from 
the text alone. This may lead to confusion when the agent comes to act on the instruction. 
For example, recall the Royal CAN VAC instruction given in Section 2.1: 
Depress door release button to open door and expose paper bag. 
(This is from a procedure for replacing the dust bag when it is full.) Whether a gen- 
eration or enablement relation holds between “depressing the button” and “opening the 
door” will depend simply on the orientation of the canister. If the canister is horizontal 
when the button is depressed and the catch released, the door will fall open of its own 
accord because of gravity. In this case, depressing the button will generate opening the 
door, without the need for further action. If however, the agent has up-ended the canister 
to make the button more accessible, depressing the button will just release the catch: 
the agent must still grasp the door and pull it open. An agent who expected the former 
may think he didn’t press the button hard enough and try again, rather than think an 
additional action was called for. Although this is a relatively trivial example, readers 
will probably recognize the problem. It could be solved by making the instruction more 
specific: 
Holding canister horizontally, depress door release button to open door and 
expose paper bag. 
However, making the text longer seems to decrease the likelihood that it will be read. 
Trying to convey the information graphically [25] relies on the reader distinguishing 
between ecessary features of the depicted scene and accidental ones. This suggests that 
producing instructions of guaranteed reliability may be an impossible task. 
3.2. Intentions and behavioral features 
In the previous section, we distinguished two relations, generation and enablement, 
holding between an action and its current purpose. Viewing purpose in terms of an 
agent’s intention to achieve it, we now discuss the need we have discovered to take 
account of that intention when computing low-level features of the action to be performed 
and animated. Such features may include the place at which the agent locates itself to 
perform the action, and the manner in which it grasps an object involved in the action 
or moves it. While our current implementation of this capability is simply via table 
look-up, a more general and extensible solution is being pursued [351 for a wide class 
of object manipulation tasks. In the meanwhile, we believe it is still worthwhile to 
illustrate the phenomenon, if only by example, since such a difference can be made 
to human figure animation by a figure’s carrying out a task-related action “naturally”, 
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even when particular behavioral choices are not necessary to simply the success of the 
specified action. 
Our first example involves the region in which an object will be grasped. If a hammer 
is to be grasped simply to enable it to be moved from place to place, any region of 
the hammer is a viable grasp location, although somewhere near its center of mass may 
make it easier for the agent to lift and transport. If however, the hammer is to be grasped 
to enable its use in hammering a nail, a more appropriate grasp region would be towards 
the end of its shank. Even then, re-orientation may be required, once the hammer is 
lifted. 
Our second example involves constraints on an agent’s target in moving to a location. 
Consider the simple instruction 
Go over to the mirror. 
By itself, this tells an agent little about where he or she is supposed to end up being 
positioned with respect to the mirror. On the other hand, specifying a goal that will be 
enabled by reaching a target location can help an agent to better identify that location. 
For example, 
Go over to the mirror and straighten it. 
Go over to the mirror and straighten your bow tie. 3 
Straightening a mirror requires manipulating it, so an agent will target a comfortable 
arm’s reach. Straightening one’s bow tie requires seeing oneself clearly: this may target 
a location either closer to or further away from the mirror, depending on the agent’s 
eyesight. Note that the instructor may not know enough about the agent to specify a 
target location in more detail: it is something that only the agent can determine. Thus 
no further explicit guidance can be provided. 
The capabilities of our existing implementation are demonstrated in an animated 
simulation of “SodaJack”, a soda fountain agent who can respond to requests for a soda 
or ice cream [28]. In this domain, the intention to perform a basic task action such 
as moving a glass so as to generate serving it to a “customer”, posts a constraint on 
the agent’s movements that the glass not be tipped to one side. On the other hand, 
moving a glass so as to enable wiping it off posts no such constraint. While a few 
simple things such as these can be done by table look-up, the problem of systematically 
characterizing those features of intended actions that affect low-level physical activity is 
of considerable difficulty. While the significance of this boundary between symbol and 
action has been recognized and formalized in [ 331, much more work is needed in order 
to actually cross it. 
3.3. intentions in means/end reasoning 
Given that instructions only convey certain features of an agent’s behavior, situated 
decision making is necessary to expand and amplify the agent’s intentions, to fill in 
3 These are examples of purposive “and”, mentioned earlier in footnote 2 and discussed in more detail in 
[ 24 1, The “and” form sounds more natural here than the “to” form. 
B. Webber et al. /Arti$cial Intelligence 73 (1995) 253-269 263 
gaps. To enable decision making to use an agent’s intentions effectively, we have found 
it worth replacing fixed set of preconditions, with reasoning about the effects of actions 
in the context in which they will be performed. 
This reflects our analysis of preconditions [ 271 as encoding claims about the universal 
desirability or undesirability of certain effects of an action. For example, failing to clear 
off a block before picking it up, may mean that objects on top of it will slide off and 
break or disturb other objects. Sometimes an agent will be concerned about this possi- 
bility; other times, not. (We assume that agents may desire to avoid particular actions 
or actions that may lead to particular states.) The problem with fixed preconditions is 
that they prevent an agent from considering an action, even if the agent doesn’t care 
about its possibly destructive side-effects. 
Limited simulation, on the other hand, can enable an agent to reason roughly about 
the effects of performing an action in a given world state. The agent can then decide 
whether or not performing the action will satisfy his intentions without violating any 
behavioral constraints. In some cases, the consequences will be acceptable given the 
agent’s current intentions, in other cases, they won’t. This use of situated reasoning 
through limited simulation allows the system to use intentions to define, in a situation- 
specific way, when an action is applicable and can be successful rather than using an a 
priori definition, (Another use of limited simulation in planning is discussed in [ 381.) 
The removal of preconditions from action operators has multiple effects. One benefit 
is to give the system more flexibility in choosing which actions to use to achieve its 
ends. However, the cost of this increased flexibility is that actions may fail to achieve 
these ends. In short, using intentions and limited simulation to perform action selection 
means the possibility of action failure must be allowed for. 
The current version of AnimNL’s planner, which eliminates preconditions in favor of 
situated reasoning about the effects of actions, is described in more detail in [26,271. 
4. Expectations from instructions 
Here we address the role of instructions in raising expectations that complement an 
agent’s current perceptions in influencing its behavior. Expectations can lead to further 
perceptual activity-not just observation but also activities that enable observation. As 
such, expectations from instructions complement the signals coming in from the outside 
world. Here we discuss three types of expectations generated by different elements in 
instruction, and the “active perception” [ 61 they can engender. 
4.1. Expectations about processes 
In some earlier work designed for creating animations from recipes, Karlin [34] 
analysed a range of temporal and frequency adverbs found in instructions. One particular 
construction she analysed is the following: 
Do (Y for (duration) or until (event) 
e.g. Steam two minutes or until mussels open. 
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Karlin notes that this is not a case of logical disjunction, where the agent can choose 
which disjunct to follow: rather, the explicit duration suggests the usual amount of time 
that it will take to just cook the mussels. This can be detected when all the mussels that 
were closed when they were put into the pot (already open ones having been discarded 
as dead) are now open. If they are not open after two minutes, the agent should wait a 
bit longer. Those that have not opened after another short wait should then be discarded, 
since they are full of mud. 
The usefulness of an expectation such as this comes from the cost of sensing. Steaming 
is usually done in a closed, opaque cooking pot, so the lid must be removed in order 
to check the state of the contents. Whenever this is done, steam escapes, setting the 
process back. The result of sensing too often then is that the mussels become tough 
through over-cooking. The expectation can therefore be used to gauge how long to wait 
before beginning to make costly sensing tests. 
4.2. Expectations about consequences 
Processes often have more than one possible outcome, depending on how long they 
proceed and how much resources they consume. Another type of expectation arising 
from instructions concerns the properties of objects that will result from such processes. 
(This is described in more detail in [ 511.) 
Consider for example, mixing flour, butter and water.4 Depending on the relative 
amounts of these three ingredients and the absorbency of the flour (different for different 
types of flour and for winter and summer wheat), the result may be anything from a 
flakey mass to a viscous batter. Instructions can indicate the intended result, so that 
the agent can modify and/or augment his actions so as to produce it. How instructions 
convey the intended result can vary: In example (la)-( Ic), the expected viscosity of 
the resulting mixture is conveyed through the verb: 
( la) Mix the flour, butter and water, and knead until smooth and shiny. 
(1 b) Mix the flour, butter and water, and spread over the blueberries. 
(lc) Mix the flour, butter and water, and stir until all lumps are gone. 
while in example (2a)-(2b), it is conveyed through the noun phrase: 
(2a) Mix the flour, butter and water. Let the dough relax for 15 minutes. 
(2b) Mix the flour, butter and water. Let the batter sit for 15 minutes. 
There are several ways in which expectations such as these can affect an agent’s behavior. 
The simplest is to monitor the result: if it doesn’t meet the agent’s expectation (too 
liquid or too solid), the agent can compensate with additional amounts of flour in the 
former case or water in the latter. Alternatively, the agent can monitor the process: that 
is, he can add the specified amount of water to the specified amounts of butter and flour 
gradually, mixing it in. If it is becoming too viscous, he can stop before adding all the 
ingredients. 
4 This is not something we are capable of animating without simulating the properties of semi-viscous fluids, 
but it is the best example for making our point. 
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4.3. Expectations about locations 
Actions can effect changes in the world that alter what an agent can perceive. Part 
of an agent’s cognitive task in understanding instructions is therefore to determine for 
each referring expression, the perceptual context in which the agent is meant to find (or 
ground) its referent. Some referring expressions in an instruction may be intended to 
refer to objects in the currently perceivable situation, while others may be intended to 
refer to objects that only appear (i.e., come into existence or become perceivable) as a 
consequence of carrying out an action specified in the instruction. 
The difference can be seen by comparing the following two instructions 
(3a) Go into Fred’s office and get me the red file folder. 
(3b) Go into Fred’s office and refile the red file folder. 
At issue is the referent of the expression “the red file folder”. In (3a), it is clearly the 
red file folder that the listener will find in Fred’s office, a file folder whose existence the 
listener may previously have not been aware of. That is, (3a) leads a listener to develop 
the expectation that after they perform the initial action and go into Fred’s office, they 
will be in a context in which it makes sense to determine the referent of “the red file 
folder”. In contrast, given instruction (3b), it is reasonable for a listener to first try to 
ground “the red file folder” in the context in which the instruction is given. If successful, 
the listener can then go into Fred’s office and refile it. If unsuccessful though, a listener 
will not just take the instruction to be infelicitous (as they would in the case of an 
instruction like “Pick up the file folder”, if there were currently no file folder around). 
Rather they will adopt the same locational expectation as in the first example, that the 
red file folder is in Fred’s office. What is especially interesting is the strength of this 
expectation: a cooperative agent will look around, if an object isn’t where they expect 
it to be until they find it. This has led Moore to develop flexible procedures he calls 
search plans [41] following [ 391, that can be used to guide an agent in grounding both 
definite and indefinite referring expressions. Moore’s search plans are able to incorporate 
expectations about the context in which a referring expression will receive its intended 
grounding, to limit search. 
In AnimNL, Di Eugenio has attempted to derive some of these expectations through 
plan inference techniques described in more detail in [ 19,201, In this case, the inferences 
are of the form: if one goes to place p for the purpose of doing action (Y, then expect to 
do CY at CL. If LY has among its applicability conditions-conditions that must hold for CY to 
make sense, in terms of its potential for success in the circumstances [ 36,44,49] -that 
one or more of its arguments be at its performance site ,u, then a locational expectation 
develops as in (3a). If not, a weaker expectation arises, as in (3b). (Notice that this 
can even arise on the basis of a single clause: “Bring me the red file folder from 
downstairs” leads to a similar expectation as (3a), while “Give the man downstairs the 
red file folder” leads to a similar expectation as (3b). Haas [ 3 11, citing examples such 
as “Pick up the book behind you”, points out a problem with indexical descriptions such 
as “the book behind you”. A listener must decide whether such descriptions are to be 
grounded before they act-in this case, so that it makes sense to turn around to see the 
book in order to pick it up-or whether they must act on the description as given.) 
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In addition to expectations concerning the location of an object satisfying a particular 
description, an agent may also develop expectations concerning the particular description 
that needs to be satisfied. Here, an instruction like “Open the paint can” is more 
illustrative than “Get the book”. An agent who simply seeks to ground the expression 
“the paint can” in its current situation may identify several objects of type “paint can”. 
On the other hand, an agent who expects to be able to open the referent of “the paint 
can” will seek to ground a more specific expression such as “the closed paint can” or 
“the paint can that needs opening”. ’ 
5. Conclusion 
The central theme of this special issue is “principled characterizations of agent- 
environment interactions”. What we have tried to characterize in this short position 
paper are ways in which agents’ understanding and use of instructions can complement 
what they can derive from the environment in which they act, lessons we have learned 
from attempting a complete vertical integration from Natural Language instructions to 
animated human figures. We have focussed on two attitudes that contribute to agents’ 
behavior-their intentions and their expectations-and shown how Natural Language in 
the form of instructions provides a source of such attitudes in ways that complement 
the environment. We have also made the point that instructions can require more than 
one context of interpretation. Thus agents’ understanding of instructions will evolve as 
their activity progresses. Understanding instructions is thus not a one-shot process that 
occurs entirely prior to activity. Language understanding is not just something that takes 
place “at the front end”. 
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